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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the district court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to
suppress evidence found in her personal container during the execution of
premises warrant when no correlative relationship existed between
Petitioner and the residence searched, her right to a reasonable expectation
of privacy precluded a search of her belongings, and there was no probable
cause to justify the doctrine of exigent circumstances.
II. Whether the district court erred in interpreting 18 U.S.C. 924(c)
to include Petitioner's receipt of a bag containing firearms in exchange for
a bag of cocaine as "using" or "carrying" a firearm during and in relation to
a drug transaction when Ms. Monroe did not actively employ a firearm
when a broad interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with its plain
meaning.
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion and order of the United States District Court for the
District of Glidden are unreported but are included as part of Appendix A.*
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction has been omitted pursuant to the Rules
of the Northern Illinois University Prize Moot Court Competition.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The texts of the following statutory provisions relevant to the
determination of the present case: 18 U.S.C. §922, 21 U.S.C. §841, 18
U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A). 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A) is set forth in Appendix B.*
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the District
of Glidden, rendered October 20, 2002. Respondent brought this action
against Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe alleging unlawful possession of a gun
and drugs in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922 and 21 U.S.C. §841, conspiracy to
distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1), and using and carrying a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c).
Ms. Monroe was convicted and sentenced to 29 years imprisonment.
Ms. Monroe filed a timely notice of appeal, and on January 2, 2003,
this court granted Petitioner leave to appeal on two distinct questions of
law: (1) whether evidence found in Ms. Monroe's purse was produced
through a lawfully executed search, and (2) whether the statutory language
of "use" and "carry" in 18 U.S.C. §924(c) can be interpreted broadly to
include a bartering transaction involving drugs and guns. Ms. Monroe
respectfully requests this court to reverse the decision of the district court
on both issues.

The brief that was submitted for the Moot Court competition contained
*
appendices, which for reasons of space and simplicity are not reproduced here.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 5, 2001, federal agents executed a premises search of
Kristine and Cameron Downing's apartment pursuant to a lawfully issued
warrant. (R.4). Probable cause for this search was based on an on-going
investigation of an alleged shell corporation operated through Kristine
Downing's restaurant. (R.2). The judge issuing the warrant authorized the
search and seizure of all business and financial documentation found at the
Downing residence that might establish the existence of the couple's
money laundering scheme. (R.3).
On the day of the search, Elizabeth Monroe and Rachel Carrier were
invited guests at the Downings' apartment. (R. 11). Ms. Carrier, a regional
buyer/seller of ladies' designer accessories at a major department store, had
brought to the apartment samples of several brand name purses for the
women to see. Id. A total of fifteen such purses were displayed in the
living room on couches, chairs, and tables. Id. The personal effects of the
three women, however, were placed in the dining room near the front door.
Id. The private belongings of the women included Ms. Carrier's coat and
purse hanging from one of the chairs at the dining table; Kristine
Downing's coat and purse on the chair next to Ms. Carrier's; and Ms.
Monroe's coat hanging from a third chair. Id. The only person actually
carrying her purse at the time was Ms. Monroe. Id.
At the moment of the officers' entry into the apartment, Ms. Carrier
and Ms. Monroe were in the living room. Id. When the two officers
identified themselves to Kristine Downing (Downing) and presented the
search warrant, she grew upset, prompting the other two ladies to her side.
Id. The officers then instructed the three women to move back into the
living room where the show purses were located. Id. At this point, the
officers split up, each searching separate rooms. Id. The women were
ordered to stand against the wall while the agents executed the warrant. Id.
Twenty minutes later, one of the agents emerged from the bedroom
carrying with him a computer disk. Id. He informed the second officer
that the disk had been found in a purse in the bedroom closet. Id. A
subsequent search of the remaining purses on the premises then took place,
requiring the officers to search both the living and dining rooms. Id.
Downing, Carrier, and Monroe were instructed to leave the living room,
and enter the dining room. Id. Ms. Monroe maintained possession of her
purse. (R. 12).
Overwhelmed by the embarrassment of this intrusion into her home,
Downing began to cry. Id. Ms. Monroe, in an attempt to console her
friend, handed Downing a packet of tissues from her purse. Id. Ms.
Monroe then placed her purse down upon the same chair holding her coat
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at the dining table in order to embrace Downing in a hug. Id. As soon as
Ms. Monroe placed her purse down with the other women's personal
belongings, however, the officer assigned to the dining room ordered the
three women back to the living room. Id.
Eventually, the agent searching the living room re-entered the dining
room carrying a handgun and a purse. Id. It was determined that the purse
in which the agent found the gun belonged to Ms. Monroe. (R.6). She was
thereafter unable to produce a license for it, which led the officers to
suspect that Ms. Monroe possessed other handguns illegally. Id.
On September 7, 2001, a warrant was issued to search Elizabeth
Monroe's apartment at 100 Elm Street, Greenwich, Glidden for illegal arms
held in possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922. (R.7). Ms. Monroe's
apartment was searched that day. (R.8). The F.B.I. agents who searched
the apartment found a list there that included the name and phone number
of Amir Muhammad, who was rumored to sell guns illegally. Id. Two
F.B.I. agents brought Muhammad to the F.B.I. building for questioning. Id.
During the interrogation, Muhammad told agents that he had arranged to
buy twenty kilograms of cocaine from Elizabeth Monroe at Mandellia Park
in Glidden on September 8, 2001, at 12:00 p.m. Id. Muhammad claimed
that in exchange for the cocaine, he was to give Ms. Monroe five AK-47s.
Id. Agents offered Muhammad the opportunity to become a cooperating
witness for the government, and Muhammad accepted. Id.
Muhammad, shadowed by F.B.I. agents, arrived at Mandellia Park on
September 8 to meet Ms. Monroe. Id. F.B.I. agents had set up both video
and audio surveillance for the transaction. Id. Upon Muhammad's arrival,
Ms. Monroe passed him a bag and confirmed that the bag contained
cocaine. (R.9). Muhammad passed Ms. Monroe a bag in return. Id.
Before Ms. Monroe inquired about or confirmed the contents of the bag,
she was arrested for conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). Id. The bag Ms. Monroe had given
contained twenty kilograms of cocaine. Id. Muhammad's bag contained
five AK-47s. Id.
On October 18, 2001, a grand jury indicted Ms. Monroe for
unlawfully possession a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922, conspiracy to
distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1), and using or carrying a gun in relation to a drug transaction in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c). (R.10). On October 1, 2002, under the
advisement of jury instructions drafted by the government, a jury found
Ms. Monroe guilty of these charges and sentenced her to a total of 348
months (29 years) imprisonment. (R.24-26, 32-33).
Petitioner appeals from this judgment and requests this Court to label
as error the denial of her motion to suppress evidence and to determine that
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receipt of a gun in exchange for drugs does not qualify as "using" or
"carrying" a gun during and in relation to a drug transaction in violation
of
18 U.S.C. §924(c).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in convicting Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe
under 18 U.S.C. §922, 21 U.S.C. §841 and 18 U.S.C. §924(c). Initially, the
conviction was in error because the district court improperly denied
Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence. Moreover, the district court erred
by determining that Petitioner's receipt of a bag containing firearms was
"using" or "carrying" a firearm during and in relation to a drug transaction.
First, the district court erred when it denied Elizabeth Monroe's
motion to suppress evidence found in her purse. The evidence was found
through an unwarranted search of her personal belongings in violation of
Ms. Monroe's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, any evidence seized
pursuant to this unlawful search of her purse should have been suppressed
in order to preserve Ms. Monroe's expectation of privacy.
No special or close relationship between Ms. Monroe and the
Downing's residence existed. Because no relationship of this type was
revealed between Ms. Monroe and the Downing apartment, the subsequent
search of Ms. Monroe's purse should have been viewed as a search of her
person. This type of search is impermissible because it lacks the
requirement of independent probable cause. Therefore, the federal agents
executing the premises search warrant should have utilized the
"relationship test," instead of the lesser used "physical possession test," to
determine whether Ms. Monroe's personal belongings were in fact
searchable. Employment of the relationship test would have disallowed the
officers' search of Ms. Monroe's purse wherever upon the premises it was
located. Thus, any items found in her purse must be suppressed as
evidence because the searching agents could construct no special
relationship between Ms. Monroe's presence and the Downing residence.
The facts as they appeared to the officers at the moment of their entry
into the Downing apartment did not require a need for unusual or
immediate action before the officers conducted their search. Therefore, no
justification existed for an employment of the doctrine of exigent
circumstances. This exception to the regulations set forth in the Fourth
Amendment is triggered when an urgent situation demands unexpected
measures. However, Ms. Monroe did not at any time during the search of
the Downing residence exhibit behavior that would indicate she presented
an imminent risk to destroy potential evidence housed in her purse.
Because no exigent circumstances existed, usage of the doctrine was
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impermissible. Thus, anything found in Ms. Monroe's purse based on the
exigent circumstances doctrine was the product of an illegal search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and should have been supprd~sed as a
result.
Second, the district court erred in interpreting petitioner's receipt of a
bag containing firearms in exchange for a bag of narcotics as "using" or
"carrying" a firearm during and in relation to a drug transaction in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §924(c). "Use" of a firearm under §924(c) requires "active
employment" of the firearm, meaning employment of the firearm to
embolden the defendant or to bring about a change in the circumstances of
the transaction. In addition, the district court's broad interpretation of
§924(c) is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the terms "use" and
"'carry."
The district court's conclusion that Ms. Monroe's receipt of a bag
containing firearms is active employment is unfounded and illogical.
Elizabeth Monroe did not actively employ a firearm. Passive receipt of a
firearm in a bartering transaction does not satisfy the "active employment"
requirement. Ms. Monroe had no opportunity to use any firearm to her
advantage whatsoever. Ms. Monroe never came into contact with the
firearms Amir Muhammad gave her, and, moreover, she never verified
what the bag contained. Mere possession of the firearm is insufficient to
show use under §924(c).
Even if "active employment" were not required to show a violation of
§924(c), the plain meaning of the terms "uses" and "carries" compels a
reversal of the district court's decision. Receipt of a firearm in a bartering
transaction falls outside the plain meaning of "using a firearm" and
"carrying a firearm" during and in relation to a drug transaction. In
addition, the legislative history of §924(c) reveals that Congress did not
intend the statute to reach receipts of firearms in bartering transactVons.
The plain meaning of "using a firearm" does not mean "receiving a
firearm." A reasonable person, upon hearing the phrase "using a firearm",
would understand it to mean a gun being fired, used to threaten or strike
someone, or used to intimidate. "To use" most commonly means "to
derive service from" or "to avail oneself of." Ms. Monroe did not derive
service from or avail herself of Muhammad's firearms.
"Carrying a firearm" does not, under its plain meaning, connote an
unknowing receipt of a firearm in a bag and holding the bag subsequent to
the transaction. A conviction for "carrying a firearm" withstands appellate
review if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant
intended to have the firearm available for use during or immediately
following the transaction, or if it facilitated the crime by emboldening the
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defendant. Ms. Monroe's conviction under the "carry" prong, therefore,
cannot stand.
Congress did not contemplate receipt of firearms in a bartering
transaction as within the scope of §924(c). Congress' intent in enacting
§924(c) was to ensure public safety by preventing violence. In eight
amendments since the enactment of §924(c), Congress has declined to
broaden the scope of the "use" and "carry" provisions. Had Congress
wanted to include mere possession of an illegal firearm under §924(c), it
could have easily done so.
In conclusion, Ms. Monroe's conviction should be reversed because
the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence and in
determining that her receipt of a bag containing firearms was "using" or
"carrying" a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c).
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND IN HER
PERSONAL CONTAINER DURING THE EXECUTION OF A
PREMISES
WARRANT
BECAUSE
NO
CORRELATIVE
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN PETITIONER, A MERE
VISITOR, AND THE RESIDENCE SEARCHED, HER RIGHT TO A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PRECLUDED A
SEARCH OF HER BELONGINGS REGARDLESS OF WHERE THEY
WERE FOUND, AND THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO
JUSTIFY THE DOCTRINE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
The district court's denial of Elizabeth Monroe's motion to suppress
evidence was erroneous because evidence found in her purse was obtained
through an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment requires a police officer or
government agent to manifest a showing of probable cause to search the
personal effects of a nonresident visitor during a lawful premises search.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause is established by showing a
relational nexus between the visitor and the premises searched or by
demonstrating a need for immediate action in the face of exigent
circumstances. See United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir.
1973); United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 543 ( 9 th Cir. 1985). Neither
condition was present to justify a search of Ms. Monroe's purse. In light of
this fact, it is apparent that the federal agents had no probable cause to
carry out a search of her personal effects, wherever such items may have
been found. Therefore, any evidence seized pursuant to this unlawful
search of her purse should have been suppressed in order to preserve her
expectation of privacy.
In essence, the breadth of a legally issued warrant is necessarily
determined by the fundamental requirement of probable cause. See United
States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1987). This prerequisite is
logically connected to an individual's relationship with the place being
searched. Id. Thus, if analysis of an individual's connection to the place
searched establishes no special/close relationship, then an ensuing search of
his or her private container found anywhere on the premises should be
viewed as a search of his or her person. Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431. This
type of search is improper because it lacks the requirement of independent
probable cause. Id. at 432. Therefore, it is imperative for law enforcement
to examine the relationship between the person to whom the container
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belongs and the premises for which the search warrant was issued. Zachary
H. Johnson, Comment, Personal Container Searches Incident to Execution
of Search Warrant, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 313, 322 (2002). Viewed in this
context, the search of Elizabeth Monroe's purse was an unwarranted
inspection of her personal effects. Thus, any items found in her purse must
be suppressed as evidence because the searching agents could construct no
special link between Petitioner's presence and the Downing residence.
An alternative premise upon which justification is made for an
otherwise unlawful search of a mere visitor's possessions is the doctrine of
exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837,
841 (D.C. Cir. 1989). This exception to the Fourth Amendment is triggered
when an urgent situation demands that unusual or immediate action be
taken. See United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 445 (111 h Cir. 1990). In
an attempt to articulate what exactly constitutes an exigent circumstance,
case law has made clear that any test must be predicated on an assessment
of the facts as they appeared to the officers either at the moment of their
entry or before they conducted the unwarranted search. See, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Examples of
such factual circumstances might include a risk of flight, an increased
chance for harm to the officers, or the possibility of destroyed evidence.
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). However, if the factual
circumstances at the moment of entry do not necessitate an urgency to act,
then there is no probable cause to suspect the visitor of any wrongdoing.
Id. Since Ms. Monroe did not at any time during the search exhibit an
imminent risk to potential evidence, a claim of exigent circumstances
cannot be used to justify a subsequent search of her purse. Thus, anything
found in Ms. Monroe's purse was the product of an illegal search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and should have been suppressed as a
result.
To ensure an equitable resolution to this question of law, the legal
scale upon which to weigh the decision of this case should give no
deference to the lower court's holding. With this said, the standard of
review of a question of law is de novo. United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S.
654, 655 (1962).
By working within this framework, Petitioner
respectfully requests relief in the form of a reversal of the district court's
holding.
A. BECAUSE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES
OFFICERS OF THE LAW TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
BEFORE EXECUTING A SEARCH OF THE PERSONAL EFFECTS OF
A MERE VISITOR TO THE PREMISES UNDER WARRANT, IT IS
INCUMBENT UPON THOSE OFFICERS TO FIRST ASCERTAIN THE
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RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE VISITOR AND THE
LOCATION IN ORDER TO PRESERVE HER REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
When presented with the question of whether a lawfully issued
warrant to search the premises includes the personal effects of a social
guest or mere visitor, a majority of the federal circuit courts have
concluded that a searching officer's analysis must focus on the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy in light of his or her relationship to said
premises. See Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431; United States v. Gray, 814 F.2d
49, 51 (1 s t Cir. (1987); Giwa, 831 F.2d at 544; United States v. Robertson,
833 F.2d 777, 783 ( 9 th Cir. 1987); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d
283, 286 ( 9 th Cir. 1988); Young, 909 F.2d at 444; Hummel-Jones v. Strope,
25 F.3d 647, 651 ( 8 thCir. 1994). To the extent that such a search exceeds
the premises warrant, and thus the protective boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment, the Micheli court advised,
[I]t should not be assumed that whatever is found on the
premises described in the warrant reasonably falls within
the proper scope of the search; rather, it is necessary to
examine why a person's belongings happen to be on the
premises ... The protective boundary established by

requiring a search warrant should encompass those
extensions of a person which he reasonably seeks to
preserve as private, regardless of where he may be.
487 F.2d at 432. Accordingly, Elizabeth Monroe's mere presence at
the Downing residence was not by itself sufficient grounds to justify a
search of her purse because she was nothing more than an invited guest
who had a reasonable expectation of privacy against searches of her person
and private belongings. Thus, Petitioner urges the Fourteenth Circuit to
adopt the "relationship test" as set forth by a majority of the federal circuits
and conclude that Ms. Monroe was subjected to an unlawful search of her
person.
In essence, a warrant to search the premises extends to officers
executing it the authority to search those places where the officers'
professional experience indicates evidence might be. State v. Nabarro, 525
P.2d 573, 574 (Haw. 1974). This standard is tempered, of course, by the
broadly accepted principle that transient visitors are not within the reach of
a premises warrant simply because they happen to be present at the place
searched. See, e
Strope, 25 F.3d at 651; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
91 (1979). Consequently, the appropriate question in determining who
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may be searched, as determined by the court in Giwa, concentrates upon
the individual's relationship to the premises under warrant. 831 F.2d at
544. Mr. Giwa, who was discovered alone and dressed only in a bathrobe,
was recognized as an overnight guest. Id. The court determined, therefore,
that he had a special association with the place where he was staying and
not simply a casual affiliation. Id. Thus, Mr. Giwa's personal belongings
were rightfully subjected to the premises search warrant. Id.
Similarly in Gray, the court found a significant nexus between the
defendant and the premises searched because of his presence at an
unusually late hour at a private residence known for drug activity. 814
F.2d at 51. The court determined that Mr. Gray's presence was for a
specific purpose outside of any casual visitation. Id.Thus, the court made
allowable the search of the defendant's jacket. Id.at 52. Using the same
standard, however, the Strope court decided that no relationship existed
that might otherwise provide officers with probable cause to believe the
defendants had a criminal association with the premises under warrant. 25
F.2d at 651. In this case, the defendants were merely patrons at a birthing
clinic suspected of practicing medicine illegally. Id. The court found,
however, that just because individuals are present at a location suspected of
illegal activity, a police officer is not permitted to make use of this fact so
as to construe a connective link between them. Id. Thus, the majority
ruled that a search of the defendants' property exceeded the scope of the
original warrant. Id.
In alignment with the reasoning of these cases is the First Circuit in
Micheli, where the briefcase of the defendant was searched after it was
found under his desk. 487 F.2d at 430. The court held that not only is an
examination between the person and the place essential in determining
whether a personal effect falls outside the scope of a warrant to search the
premises, but such an examination is also applicable for private belongings
not currently worn on one's person or temporarily put down. Id. at 431.
Because of the defendant's co-ownership of the location searched, he
enjoyed a special relationship with the premises under warrant, such that it
could reasonably be expected that some of his personal belongings would
be there. Id. at 432. The court held, therefore, that a search of his briefcase
was properly carried out. Id. Likewise in McLaughlin, the court found that
the search of a co-owner's briefcase was permissible due to the strong
connection between the co-owner and his company. 851 F.2d at 286. The
court reasoned that a co-owner's control over the premises in question
made his relationship to the location more predictable and permanent. Id.
Therefore, a search of the defendant's personal container fell within the
confines of the warrant. Id.
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As delineated by the foregoing case law, the appropriate measure for
determining the propriety of a premises warrant which seeks to encompass
the personal belongings of a casual visitor or social guest is an application
of the relationship test. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Circuit must view the
search of Ms. Monroe's purse as an unwarranted act in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because the only connection linking her to the
Downing apartment was her presence there at the time of the search.
Unlike the facts presented in Strope, the officers executing the premises
warrant of the Downing residence were given notice before the
commencement of their search as to what Ms. Monroe's relationship to the
premises might be. (R. 11). Thus, Petitioner's mere presence in an
apartment, which allegedly contained financial records indicating the
existence of a shell corporation, cannot be construed as an abdication of her
right to privacy in her person and private effects. (R.2). For this reason,
Ms. Monroe's purse, although momentarily put down on the same chair
holding her coat, should not have been examined. (R.12). Any evidence
found therein should therefore be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful
search.
Nevertheless, respondent may argue that the police cannot realistically
be expected to avoid searching the property of a mere visitor to the
premises unless the officers are put on notice as to the ownership of those
items. Nabarro, 525 P.2d at 576. Whether the police had obtained such
notice sufficient to indicate that they were indeed searching the personal
effects of a visitor must be determined on the facts of each case. Hayes v.
State, 234 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). In the case at bar, there
can be no question but that the federal agents had actual notice of the fact
that Ms. Monroe, a non-resident visitor, was the owner of the purse at
issue. (R. 11). After having worn the container on her person for more than
twenty-five of the forty-five minute search, Ms. Monroe had provided
sufficient notice to prove that the officers knew or should have known that
this particular purse was her personal property. Id. With the aid of this
notice, any consequent search of her purse should be seen as an
unreasonable intrusion into her privacy since she maintained no
relationship with the residence she was visiting.
Even a superficial examination of the facts would show that Elizabeth
Monroe was nothing more than an invited social guest to the Downings'
apartment.
Therefore, the government falls short in demonstrating
probable cause to search Ms. Monroe's purse. As a result, a ruling in favor
of Petitioner's motion to suppress must be granted.
B. A NONRESIDENT VISITOR CARRIES WITH HER AN
EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY, WHICH
PROTECTS
HER
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SEARCHED,
UNLAWFULLY
FROM BEING
BELONGINGS
WHEREVER THOSE ITEMS MIGHT BE FOUND ON THE PREMISES.
Challenging the relationship test is the less recognized "physical
possession test." The validity of the possession test depends upon whether
the personal belongings of a mere visitor to the premises under warrant are
on her person or under her physical control. See, e.g., United States v.
Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 496 ( 7 h Cir. 1968). When the test is applied, the
nature of the individual's relationship to the premises is irrelevant. Id.
However, the employment of such a rule diverts attention from the vested
interest one has in the privacy of her property, wherever it may be located.
Nabarro, 525 P.2d at 576. To preserve this interest, this court must not
focus on the physical location of Ms. Monroe's purse but rather her
relationship to the premises searched.
Federal circuit courts applying the physical possession test propose,
first and foremost, that the police should not be prohibited from searching a
visitor's personal property not on the visitor's person. See, e.., United
States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This type of
adjudication supports the searching of all such items found on the premises
that are plausible repositories for the objects of the search. Id. However,
personal containers can also serve as a common repository for one's private
effects. This being the case, any container that by its nature can support a
reasonable expectation of privacy, such as Ms. Monroe's purse, may not be
searched without a separately issued warrant. See, United States v. Branch,
545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Without the requirement of a separate
warrant, law enforcement would have carte blanche to employ any
investigative methodologies they chose at the expense of individual rights
expounded in the Constitution. Diane L. Schmauder, Annotation, Propriety
of Search of Nonoccupant Visitor's Belongings Pursuant to Warrant Issued
for Another's Premises, 51 A.L.R. 5 th 375, 402 (1997). Thus, Ms.
Monroe's purse should not have been searched because it was shrouded
with a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of an unwarranted search of
one's personal belongings, there is case law in support of this procedure.
For instance, in Teller, the defendant's purse was searched after she had
placed it on the end of her bed upon her arrival home. 397 F.2d at 496. In
similar fashion, the court in Johnson found that the defendant's purse,
which lay in front of her on a table when the police entered the premises,
was legally within the ambit of the search warrant. 475 F.2d at 978.
The preceding cases illustrate the fundamental flaw in making use of
such a test. If the courts and law enforcement officials focus only on
whether the individual visitor has physical possession of the personal effect
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under review, then they will have left vulnerable many private items, such
as wallets, purses, or coats, which are very often put down on chairs or
tables by their owners once inside the premises. Micheli, 487 F.2d at 430.
This arrangement clearly flies in the face of an individual's expectation of
his or her privacy. Of equal importance is the limiting effect the physical
possession test has even when it is properly applied. Thus, if anyone inside
the premises to be searched does nothing more than pick up incriminating
objects in his or her hands before police officers pass through the threshold,
the search warrant is bereaved of its effectiveness. Id. at 431.
Furthermore, the employment of the physical possession test poses too
great a risk to a person's right of privacy when he or she does nothing more
than drop by a friend's apartment. This is especially true when the owner's
residence is under a premises search warrant. In this basic analysis, a
distinction lies between the occupant, whose home and personal belongings
are within the scope of the warrant, and the visitor, who continues to enjoy
an expectation of privacy in all her personal effects, regardless of where
they have been placed temporarily. Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431.
Petitioner therefore calls upon this court to implement the relationship
test in favor of its physical possession counterpart.
Adopting the
relationship test would not only ensure Ms. Monroe's expectation of
privacy in personal belongings brought to whatever location she happens to
enter, but it would also impress upon law enforcement the negative impact
of guesswork. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Circuit must conclude that Ms.
Monroe's purse was an unsearchable item. As such, any evidence found
therein should be suppressed as a matter of law.
C. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH OFFICERS
CONDUCTED THE INSPECTION OF THE PREMISES WERE NOT
EXIGENT, RENDERING THE SEARCH OF PETITIONER'S
PERSONAL BELONGINGS UNWARRANTED.
By definition, search and seizures undertaken without a legally issued
warrant are presumed arbitrary and unreasonable, subject only to a few
well-defined exceptions. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One
such exception to the general restrictions of the Fourth Amendment is the
doctrine of "exigent circumstances."
However, employment of this
doctrine must be predicated upon an officer's objectively reasonable belief
that immediate action is required in lieu of the constitutional regulations
guiding this area of the law. See, .., Johnson, 802 F.2d at 1461. To
satisfy an officer's reasonable belief, therefore, a showing of probable
cause becomes necessary to justify the view that an emergency exists. Id.
The officers executing the premises warrant of the Downing residence
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lacked the requisite probable cause to reasonably believe Ms. Monroe
presented an imminent threat to potential evidence because her conduct did
not necessitate urgent action. Therefore, the subsequent search of her
purse, based ostensibly upon alleged exigent circumstances, was unlawful.
In an attempt to distill the various situations in which exigencies may
present themselves, the Supreme Court has recognized three general
circumstances wherein employment of the exigent circumstances doctrine
is normally seen. See, ._.,Olsen, 495 U.S. at 100. These might be
classified as when an individual present at the premises of a search warrant
is thought likely to escape, where officers reasonably believe that delaying
a search will considerably increase the risk of serious harm to themselves
or others, or if officers perceive that a delay in the execution of a search
would put evidence in jeopardy of being removed or destroyed. Id. If
officers acting upon a validly issued premises warrant encounter any of
these factual circumstances, they may be permitted to conduct a search of
one's person or personal effects without the aid of a separate warrant to do
so. Id. Those officers executing a search without a warrant, however, must
illustrate a probable cause. Id. at 101. Thus, if there is an absence of
probable cause for the contention that a mere visitor presents a risk, the
doctrine of exigent circumstances is inappropriately utilized. Barbara C.
Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 Hastings L.J.
283, 285 (1988).
In the case at bar, it is clear that the officers at the Downing residence
relied on an alleged belief that Ms. Monroe presented an imminent risk of
destroying potential evidence contained in her purse. (R.18). In assessing
the propriety of a search pursuant to this type of belief, the court of Rivera
instructed,
[I]n determining whether agents reasonably feared
imminent destruction of the evidence, the appropriate
inquiry is whether the facts, as they appeared at the
moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced
agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed before a
warrant could be secured.
825 F.2d 152, 156. The facts of Rivera present a situation in which
the doctrine of exigent circumstances was properly employed. Federal
agents entered the hotel room of a known drug dealer who had given the
agents probable cause to believe that he was in the process of destroying
illegal contraband. Id. Thus, the doctrine of exigent circumstances was
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applicable because the officers at the scene manifested a reasonable belief
that evidence was in imminent risk of destruction. Id. at 157.
Much like the drug related evidence found in Rivera, the facts
involved in Tartaglia provided police officers with the requisite probable
cause to make an unwarranted search of a suspected drug dealer's train
compartment under the exigent circumstances rule. 864 F.2d at 839. In
this case, the train on which the suspect traveled was to depart
immediately. Id. at 840. Faced with this time constraining exigency, the
officers properly employed the exigent circumstances doctrine to conduct
an unwarranted search and seizure of the suspect's personal belongings. Id.
at 842. Similarly, the court in Young ruled that law enforcement's
utilization of the doctrine was appropriate for the circumstances the officers
faced. 909 F.2d at 445. The court found that the defendant's attempted
escape from the scene provided the officers with probable cause to
reasonably believe that Ms. Johnson was in the process of destroying
potential evidence housed in her "bulging" purse. Id. at 446. Thus, the
doctrine of exigent circumstances applied. Id.
The factual circumstances of Robertson, however, compelled the court
to rule that no exigencies were present. 833 F.2d at 785. Defendant
Steeprow was in the process of leaving the premises for which the warrant
had been issued when the police descended on the scene. Id. at 778. The
court ruled, however, that Steeprow's mere presence near the premises
could not support a search of her personal belongings. Id. at 785. Thus,
employment of the exigent circumstances doctrine was unwarranted. Id.
The case before the court is similar to Robertson, in that no factual
circumstances, exigent or otherwise, could be identified that might lead the
agents to believe that Ms. Monroe presented an imminent risk to destroy
any evidence contained in here purse. Even assuming, arguendo, that a
need to act urgently had in fact presented itself to the officers, the exigency
itself must be viewed from the totality of the circumstances known to the
officers at the time of their warrantless intrusion. People of Territory of
Guam v. Bora, 732 F.2d 733, 736 (9' Cir. 1984). The totality of the
circumstances in the present case included not only the fact that one agent
had found a disk in a back bedroom purse. (R.4). They also presented to
the searching officers was a view of the dining room, which contained the
personal effects of the three women in attendance; the fact that Ms. Monroe
carried her purse on her person for more than twenty-five minutes of the
search; and the words, "You had to come the one time my friends were
visiting?" screamed by Downing when the officers entered the apartment.
(R. 11). The totality of this evidence tends to show not only that Ms.
Monroe had no special relationship with the premises searched, but also a
lack of any obvious exigent circumstances. Beyond her mere proximity to
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the independently suspected Downing residence, therefore, no factual
circumstances can support a search of Ms. Monroe's purse.
Elizabeth Monroe was a mere visitor to the Downing residence when
the federal agents executed their search. No relationship between Ms.
Monroe and her friend's apartment, beyond here presence there, could be
established. Furthermore, Ms. Monroe exhibited no unusual behavior nor
manifested any probable cause that could have led the agents to believe that
she posed an imminent risk to evidence found anywhere on the premises.
Therefore, the Fourteenth Circuit must reverse the district court's holding,
due to Ms. Monroe's motion to suppress evidence being improperly denied.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING 18
U.S.C. 924(c) TO INCLUDE PETITIONER'S RECEIPT OF A BAG
CONTAINING FIREARMS IN EXCHANGE FOR A BAG OF COCAINE
AS "USING" OR "CARRYING" A FIREARM DURING AND IN
RELATION TO A DRUG TRANSACTION BECAUSE MS. MONROE
DID NOT ACTIVELY EMPLOY A FIREARM AND THE DISTRICT
COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS PLAIN MEANING.
The District Court for the District of Glidden erred in interpreting 18
U.S.C. 924(c) to include Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe's receipt of a firearm
in exchange for narcotics as "using" or "carrying" a firearm during and in
relation to a drug transaction. (R.31). The district court's narrow
interpretation of §924(c) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Bailey v. United States, holding that use of a firearm requires "active
employment." 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995). Moreover, the district court's
interpretation distorts the plain language of the statute. Thus, the standard
of review of a question of law is de novo. United States v. Diebold, 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The district court's interpretation of 924(c) is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Bailey v. United States, interpreting the "use"
prong of §924(c)(1) as requiring "evidence sufficient to show an active
employment of the firearm by the defendant." 516 U.S. at 143 (emphasis in
original). Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe's passive receipt of a bag containing
firearms was not active employment of a firearm because it was not used as
a weapon or used in any way to bring about a change in the circumstances
of the drug transaction. (R.8-9).
Assuming, arguendo, the active employment requirement did not
exist, the plain language of the statute alone compels a reversal of the
district court's decision. When a term is not defined in a statute, the term
should be given its ordinary and natural meaning. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at
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145; Smith v. United States 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). The plain meaning
of the phrase "using a firearm" does not include receiving a firearm in a
bartering transaction and the plain meaning of the phrase "carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug transaction" does not include
possession of a firearm subsequent to the transaction. See e
United
States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Warwick, 167 F.3d 965 (6h Cir. 1999); United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d
728 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Though using a firearm may mean more than use as
a weapon, Congress did not contemplate a receipt-through-barter
transaction when it enacted the statute and subsequently has declined to
include that type of transaction in amendments to §924(c)(1). Federal Gun
Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 924 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) (2002)).
Therefore, Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe's receipt of a bag containing
firearms was not "using" or "carrying" a firearm because she did not
actively employ a firearm or "use" or "carry" a firearm under the plain
meaning of this statute. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
reverse the decision of the district court finding Petitioner guilty of
violating §924(c).
A. PASSIVE RECEIPT OF A FIREARM IN A BARTERING
TRANSACTION DOES NOT SATISFY THE ACTIVE EMPLOYMENT
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE "USE" PRONG OF 18 U.S.C. 924(c).
Receipt of a firearm in a bartering transaction is not "use" of a firearm
as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See
Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at
435; Warwick, 167 F.3d at 976; Stewart, 246 F.3d at 732. Bailey
interpreted the "use" prong of §924(c) to require a showing of active
employment of a firearm during and in relation to a drug transaction. 516
U.S. at 143. Accordingly, passive receipt of a firearm in exchange for
drugs does not satisfy the active employment requirement.
E..-.,
Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 435.
The district court's decision that Ms. Monroe's receipt of the bag was
active employment of the firearm is illogical because one who receives a
bag, without knowledge that the bag contains firearms, cannot actively
employ the firearms contained in the bag. Elizabeth Monroe did not
actively employ a firearm. (R.8-9). Ms. Monroe executed a transaction
with Amir Muhammad. Id. Muhammad never communicated to Ms.
Monroe that the bag she received contained firearms. Id. Ms. Monroe
never even looked in the bag she received from Muhammad before the
police arrested her. Id. It cannot be said that "a defendant 'uses' a gun
when he receives it during a drug transaction. The recipient has not
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employed the gun, or derived any service from the gun by simply trading
his drugs for it." Stewart, 246 F.3d at 731. The Stewart court concluded,
"Indeed, nothing in a person's acceptance of a gun embodies the active
employment demanded by the Court in Bailey." Id. (citing Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995)).
A number of circuits have explained why receipt of guns through
barter is not active employment. Eg± Warwick, 167 F.3d 965. Warwick
involved a defendant who accepted a gun as partial payment for drugs. 167
F.3d at 969. The court held,
A defendant who does nothing more than accept a weapon
offered to him.. .cannot be said to "actively" do anything
with that weapon because receipt and acceptance is
inherently passive conduct.
...
No matter how we phrase the events of this transaction,
the defendant is on the passive side of the bargain. He
received the gun. He was paid with the gun. He accepted
the gun. But in no sense did he actively "use" the gun.
Id. at 975. The only person actively employing the gun in the case at
bar was Muhammad. (R.8-9). In Westmoreland, the defendant exchanged
crack-cocaine for marijuana, guns, and cash. 122 F.3d at 432. Relying on
Bailey, the court reasoned, "If a buyer pays for a gun with $100, we would
not say that the seller has used the $100 in selling his gun. A seller does
not use a buyer's consideration." Id. at 435-36. Ms. Monroe, therefore, did
not "use" Muhammad's firearms by receiving them in a bartering
transaction.
The purpose of 924(c) is to penalize use of firearms in connection
with drug trafficking that may lead to violence. See Smith, 508 U.S. 223 at
240. The district court's interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with
that purpose. The decision below penalized Ms. Monroe for possession of
firearms despite her having no actual knowledge that she possessed them.
Bailey confirmed that mere possession is insufficient to show use. 516
U.S. at 143. "Had Congress intended possession alone to trigger liability
under Sec. 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided. This obvious
conclusion is supported by the frequent use of the term 'possess' in the
Id.
gun-crime statutes to describe prohibited gun-related conduct."
applied
924(c)
that
further
explained
Bailey
omitted).
citations
(internal
not to possession of a firearm but to a firearm being used to bring about a
change in the circumstances of the predicate offense, implicitly through
violence. Id. There was no risk of violence on behalf of Ms. Monroe. The

2003]

BEST PETITIONER'S BRIEF

guns contained in the bag she received were an inert presence in the
transaction. Id. at 148.
Respondent relies on Smith and its progeny to support the theory that
any bartering transaction involving guns and drugs is a violation of 924(c)
because Bailey stated that its decision was not inconsistent with Smith.
Bailey, 516 U.S. 148; (R. 27-29). Respondent's reliance on these cases is
unsubstantiated for two reasons. First, the cases misinterpret the active
employment requirement. Second, they are inapplicable to the case at bar
because they do not address situations in which the defendant had no actual
knowledge of receiving firearms. See United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949
(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (1996); United
States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Sumler, 294 F.3d 579 (3r Cir. 2002). In Ulloa and Cannon, it was evident
the defendants were aware of the presence of firearms in the transaction
because each had told undercover officers he or she wanted to trade drugs
for guns. Ulloa, 94 F.3d at 950; Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1499. Similarly, in
Ramirez-Rangel, the defendants had arranged with government agents to
barter drugs for guns; the officers brought the guns in bags and gave them
to the defendants. 103 F.3d at 1503. The key difference between RamirezRangel and the case at bar is that in Ramirez-Rangel the defendants opened
the bags and verified they contained guns. Id.Ms. Monroe was arrested
before she made any investigation into what was in the bags she received.
(R. 9). In Sumler, the defendant acquired the gun through bartering, then
he used it to threaten a disgruntled drug customer, as well as some
inhabitants of the house where the exchange took place. 294 F.3d at 581.
The Court of Appeals cases that support Respondent's position are all
factually dissimilar to Ms. Monroe's case.
Furthermore, while Bailey did not overrule Smith, it drastically
narrowed the scope of the statute to include only transactions where the
firearm was actively employed. The Smith court's only conclusion was
that using a firearm in a guns-for drugs trade may constitute using a firearm
within the meaning of the statute. 508 U.S. 223. To support the theory that
all bartering transactions violated 924 (c), Respondent relies on the Bailey
court's inclusion of bartering in a list of examples of active employment
that might fall within the 924(c)(1) definitions of use; however, the
Supreme Court "did not purport to be encompassing every possible
situation involving barter as a violation of that statute." Stewart, 246 F.3d
at 732. The Bailey court's conclusion of the word bartering in its list of
examples "does not compel a conclusion that a person who barters drugs to
acquire a firearm has used the firearm, as opposed to using the drugs." Id.
"It does not matter whether a drug dealer initiates a drugs-for-guns
transaction or simply agrees to (and does) trade drugs for guns in lieu of
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money (or some other consideration). Under either scenario, the drug
dealer le not used the gun within the meaning of 924(c)." Id. The court
further advised that,
We must conclude under Bailey that passively receiving a
gun from an undercover agent in payment for drugs cannot
constitute a use under section 924(c)(1). When we
consider, as did the Supreme Court in both Bailey and
Smith, the ordinary or natural meaning of the word "use,"
we note that there is no grammatically correct way to
express that a person receiving a payment is thereby
"using" the payment.. .No matter how we phrase the events
in this transaction, the defendant is on the passive side of
the bargain.
Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 435.
In light of the active employment requirement set forth in Bailey, this
court is compelled to conclude that Ms. Monroe's receipt of a bag
containing firearms was not use of a firearm under 924(c). Bailey
narrowed the scope of 924(c) to exclude transactions such as Ms.
Monroe's. 516 U.S. at 148. At the time of the transaction, Ms. Monroe
was incapable of actively employing a firearm because she had no
knowledge that a firearm was in her possession. (R.8-9). Even if Ms.
Monroe had had such knowledge, her possession was not calculated to
bring about a change in the circumstances of the transaction that could have
resulted in violence. Respondent offers no authority to support that such
unwitting possession of a bag containing firearms can be considered active
employment of a firearm. The only sound legal conclusion that can be
made in this case is that Ms. Monroe's transaction falls outside the scope of
924(c).
B. THE PLAIN MEANING OF "USING OR CARRYING" A
FIREARM DURING AND IN RELATION TO A DRUG
TRANSACTION EXCLUDES THE RECEIPT OF A FIREARM IN A
BARTERING TRANSACTION.
Ms. Monroe did not "use" or "carry" a firearm under the plain
meaning of those terms. When an ambiguous term is not defined in a
statute, the term should be given its ordinary and natural meaning. Se.,
e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995); Smith v. United
Attention to the meaning of an
States 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
when the words describe an
heightened
be
ambiguous term "should
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element of a criminal offense." Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (quoting Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-141 (1994)). Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe
is entitled to an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) in accordance with its
plain meaning, as the statute imposes the criminal penalty of an additional
five-years imprisonment for using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking transaction. The terms "uses" and "carries"
are ambiguous and the plain meaning of those terms does not include
receipt of a bag containing firearms in exchange for a bag of cocaine.
Thus, this court must reverse Petitioner's conviction under §924(c).
1. Receipt of firearms in a bartering transaction falls outside the
plain meaning of "using a firearm."
The phrase "using a firearm" does not include receipt of a bag
containing firearms in a bartering transaction. An ordinary person, upon
hearing the phrase, would understand it to mean a gun being fired, used to
threaten or strike someone, or used to intimidate. Elizabeth Monroe did no
such act.
Respondent argues that §924(c) sweeps broadly and that under Smith
v. United States, a bartering transaction involving guns and drugs is use of
a firearm. (R. 27-28). Smith involved a defendant who offered to
exchange his firearm with a government agent, posing as a pawnshop
dealer, for drugs. Smith, 508 U.S. at 226. The Court decided that "using"
included employing a gun as an item of barter in addition to employing it
as a weapon. Id. at 241. Two years later, in Bailey v. United States, the
Supreme Court rejected the Smith court's broad interpretation of §924(c).
Bailey, 516 U.S. 137 at 148; United States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431
(7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Warwick, 167 F.3d 965 (6h Cir. 1999);
United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The receipt of a firearm in a bartering transaction should be sharply
distinguished from the use of a firearm to obtain drugs (as was present in
Smith). In Smith, the Court found the defendant in violation of §924(c) for
offering a government agent, posing as a pawnshop dealer, a firearm in
exchange for drugs. 508 U.S. at 226. In its analysis, the Court surveyed
dictionary definitions of "to use." Smith, 508 U.S. at 229. The survey
produced the definitions, "to convert to one's service," "to employ," "to
make use of," "to carry out a purpose or action by means of," "to avail
oneself of," and "to utilize." Id. Elizabeth Monroe did not convert a
firearm to her service or avail herself of a firearm. By these ordinary
definitions of "to use" Elizabeth Monroe did not use a firearm during and
in relation to a drug transaction.
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In United States v. Stewart, the District of Columbia Circuit explained
that a person who pays for a gun with drugs has not used the gun. 246 F.3d
at 731. "For example, when a person pays a cashier a dollar for a cup of
coffee in the courthouse cafeteria, the customer has not used the coffee. He
has only used the dollar bill." Id. Justice Scalia illustrated the plain
meaning in Smith in saying, "When someone asks, 'Do you use a cane?' he
is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's silver-handled
walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk
with a cane." 508 U.S. at 242 (6-3 decision) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Expanding the plain meaning of an ambiguous term in Justice Scalia's
example leads to confusion. In the context of a criminal statute, distortion
of plain meaning leads to unjust imposition of a criminal penalty. Ratzlaf,
510 U.S. 135, 140-141. Therefore, this Court should interpret the "use"
prong of §924(c) in accordance with its ordinary and natural meaning,
which does not include receipt of a firearm in a bartering transaction.
Thus, Elizabeth Monroe's receipt was not a violation of §924(c).
2. The plain meaning of "carrying a firearm" during and in relation
to a dru2 transaction does not include possession of a bartered firearm
subsequent to the transaction.
Ms. Monroe did not "carry" a firearm "during and in relation to" a
drug transaction. Ms. Monroe did not transport or even possess a firearm
until her transaction with Amir Muhammad was complete. (R.8-9). Even
when Ms. Monroe acquired the bag containing firearms, she had not
confirmed that the bag contained guns; therefore, Ms. Monroe could not
have been "carrying" a gun "during" or "in relation to" a drug transaction.
Id.
In Muscarello v. United States, the Supreme Court adhered to the
plain meaning of "carries" in deciding that under §924(c), the phrase
"carries a firearm" "applies to a person who knowingly possesses and
conveys firearms..." 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998). Therefore, under no
interpretation of Muscarello can a person who unknowingly possesses a
firearm be considered to "carry" a firearm. Therefore, Ms. Monroe's
knowledge about and control over the firearms in her transaction with
Muhammad is insufficient to support a conclusion that she "carried" guns
in violation of 924(c). "[A] conviction under 924(c)(1) will withstand
appellate review if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the
defendant intended to have the firearm available for use during or
immediately following the transaction, or if it facilitated the crime by
emboldening the defendant." Warwick, 167 F.3d at 971; See also, United
States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177 (5 h Cir. 1989) (holding that the
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evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant's pistol was carried "in
relation to" drug trafficking where, among other things, the defendant
reached for his pistol when the police approached). No inferential leap
could bridge the gap between Ms. Monroe's passive receipt of firearms and
an intention to have a gun available for use during the transaction.
Muhammad's guns were not accessible to Ms. Monroe. She would not
have been able to grab one of them to defend herself against Muhammad or
the police. Furthermore, Muhammad's transport of the firearms to the
place of exchange did nothing to embolden Ms. Monroe. In fact, it did the
opposite.
"To establish that a firearm was carried 'in relation to' a drug
trafficking offense, the evidence must support a finding that the firearm
furthered the purpose or effect of the crime and that its presence or
involvement was not the result of coincidence." Warwick, 167 F.3d at 971
(citing Smith, 508 U.S. 223 at 238). The guns Ms. Monroe possessed after
the transaction were an "inert presence." Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 436.
Mere presence of a gun is not enough to impose penalties under §924(c).
Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. Since Ms. Monroe did not bring a firearm to the
transaction, the presence of the firearm could not have been calculated to
embolden her or to bring about a change in circumstances of the
transaction. Furthermore, she had no confirmation that firearms were in
here possession. Therefore, under any reading of Muscarello, Ms. Monroe
could not have "carried" a firearm in violation of §924(c). Under the plain
meaning of the statute, Ms. Monroe is not in violation of either the "use" or
"carry" prong. Thus, her conviction must be reversed.
3. The legislative history of §924(c) reveals that Congress did not
intend the statute to reach receipts of firearms in bartering transactions.
Congress did not contemplate receipt of a firearm in a bartering
transaction when it drafted §924(c). When §924(c) was first enacted, it
dealt with the use of a firearm during crimes of violence; the provision
concerning use of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking
offenses was added later. The original version, passed in 1968, read:
(c)Whoever (1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or (2)
carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United
term of imprisonment for
States, shall be sentenced to a
than
10 years.
not less than one year nor more
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Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 924, 82 Stat.
1213, 1224. "The phrase 'uses to commit' indicated that Congress
originally intended to reach the situation where the firearm was actively
employed during commission of the crime." Bailey, 516 U.S. at 147.
Congress' intent was to ensure "public safety" by prohibiting the use of a
gun to bring about a change in the circumstances of the drug transaction
resulting in violence. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 240. Elizabeth Monroe was
in no way using a firearm to bring about a change in the circumstances in
her transaction with Amir Muhammad. Moreover, Ms. Monroe was not
poised to commit an act of violence. (R.8-9).
Since 1968, Congress has amended §924(c) eight times. Despite
numerous amendments to the statute, Congress has not since the enactment
of §924(c) chosen to broaden the scope of "use" or "carry" prong, by
prohibiting bartering for or with a firearm. Westmoreland 122 F.3d at 436.
In the absence of Congress' clarification of 924(c), .the statute should be
interpreted according to its plain meaning, which does not encompass
receipt of a firearm in a bartering transaction.
In sum, Petitioner Elizabeth Monroe's receipt of a bag containing
firearms was not "using" or "carrying" because she did not actively employ
a firearm or "use" or "carry" a firearm under the plain meaning of the
statute. Therefore, this court should reverse the decision of the district
court finding Elizabeth Monroe guilty of violating §924(c).
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Elizabeth
Monroe respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse the decision
of the district court finding her guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §922, 21
U.S.C. §841, and 18 U.S.C. §924(c).
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